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Abstract
Deep Neural Network (DNN) are vulnerable to adversarial attack. Existing methods
are devoted to developing various robust training strategies or regularizations to
update the weights of the neural network. But beyond the weights, the overall
structure and information flow in the network are explicitly determined by the
neural architecture, which remains unexplored. This paper thus aims to improve the
adversarial robustness of the network from the architecture perspective with NAS
framework. We explore the relationship among adversarial robustness, Lipschitz
constant, and architecture parameters and show that an appropriate constraint on
architecture parameters could reduce the Lipschitz constant to further improve the
robustness. For NAS framework, all the architecture parameters are equally treated
when the discrete architecture is sampled from supernet. However, the importance
of architecture parameters could vary from operation to operation or connection
to connection, which is not explored and might reduce the confidence of robust
architecture sampling. Thus, we propose to sample architecture parameters from
trainable multivariate log-normal distributions, with which the Lipschitz constant of
entire network can be approximated using a univariate log-normal distribution with
mean and variance related to architecture parameters. Compared with adversarially
trained neural architectures searched by various NAS algorithms as well as efficient
human-designed models, our algorithm empirically achieves the best performance
among all the models under various attacks on different datasets.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have shown remarkable performance in various applications, such as image
classification [1, 2, 3], object detection [4], and machine translation [5]. However, recent works
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10] have shown that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial samples that can fool the networks
to make wrong predictions with only perturbations of the input data, which has caused security issues.
To deal with the threat of adversarial samples, the majority of existing works focus on robust training
which optimizes the weights of robust DNNs through feeding adversarial samples generated by attack
approaches (e.g. FGSM). Although the trained networks show good robustness on various attacks, the
architectures of these networks are fixed during optimization, which limits the adversarial robustness
improvement. The efficient architectures designed by human experts, such as AlexNet and ResNet
[11, 3], suggest that the DNN performance is subject to the architecture of network. Recent boosting
NAS studies also emphasize the influence of architecture. Hence, we ask a simple question:
Can the network be initialized with robust architecture to further obtain adversarial robustness?
A recent study has shown that different architectures tend to have different levels of adversarial
robustness [12]. However, besides the empirical experiments, the connections between the architec-
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tures and the adversarial robustness remain unexplored. In this paper, we explore the relationship
between adversarial robustness and the architecture of network through establishing their connections
to Lipschitz constant under NAS framework. Existing NAS algorithms used to utilize architec-
ture parameters for sampling discrete superior architectures, where all the elements of architecture
parameters are equally treated for selection without exploring their discrepancies, which reduces
the reliability of sampled architecture and raises a demand for confidence learning of architecture
parameters. Thus, we propose to sample architecture parameters from trainable distributions instead
of initializing them directly.
Our proposed algorithm Adversarially Robust Neural Architecture Search with Confidence Learning
(RACL) starts from the approximation of Lipschitz constant of entire neural network under NAS
framework, where we derive the relationship between Lipschitz constant and architecture parameters.
We further propose to sample architecture parameters from log-normal distributions. With the usage
of the properties of log-normal distribution, we show that the Lipschitz constant of entire network can
be approximated with another log-normal distribution with mean and variance related to architecture
parameters so that a constraint can be formulated in a form of cumulative function to achieve Lipschitz
constraint on the architecture. Our algorithm achieves an efficient robust architecture search and
RACL empirically achieves superior adversarial robustness compared with other NAS algorithms as
well as state-of-the-art models through a series of experiments under different settings.
2 Methodology
2.1 Preliminary
Given the input x ∈ RD and annotated label vector y ∈ RM where M is the total number of classes,
the neural networkN maps perturbed input x˜ = x+δ to a label vector yˆ = N (x˜;W,A). The network
architecture is represented by A, and its filter weight is denoted as W . The objective of adversarial
attacks is to find the perturbed input x˜ which leads to wrong predictions through maximizing the
classification loss as
x˜ = argmax
x˜:‖x˜−x‖p6
LCE(N (x˜;W,A), y), (1)
whereLCE(yˆ, y) = −
∑M
i=1 y
(i)log(yˆ(i)), and the perturbation is constrained by its lp-norm. Various
powerful attacks have been proposed and shown high attack success rates, such as Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) [13] and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [14]. To defend these attacks,
regularizing the weight matrix of each layer to form a Lipschitz constrained network has been proven
to be beneficial for the adversarial robustness [15, 16].
Let F = L ◦ N be the mapping from the input to the classification loss, and the difference of loss
after an adversarial attack can be bounded as
‖F(x+ δ, y;W,A)−F(x, y;W,A)‖ 6 λF‖δ‖, (2)
where λF is the Lipschitz constant of function F with respect to ‖.‖p. Together with ‖δ‖p 6 , the
generalization error with perturbed input can be bounded as
E
xvD
[F(x˜)] 6 E
xvD
[F(x)] + E
xvD
[ max
‖x˜−x‖6
|F(x˜)−F(x)|] 6 E
xvD
[F(x)] + λF · . (3)
which suggests that neural networks can defend against adversarial examples with a smaller Lipschitz
constant. Given a constraint on λF , an adversarial robust formulation can be written as
min
A,W
E[F(x, y;W,A)] s.t. λF 6 λ∗F , (4)
where λ∗F is the optimal Lipschitz constant. Existing works often consider a fixed network architectureA in Eq. (4), and focus on optimizing network weight for improved robustness, where the influence
of architecture is ignored. Recent studies highlight the importance of architecture. Liu et al. conducts
thorough experiments to empirically demonstrate that the better trade-offs of some pruning techniques
mainly come from the architecture itself [17]. Boosting NAS algorithms involve optimization on
architecture to obtain better performance with small model size [18, 19]. We are therefore motivated
to investigate the influence of neural architecture on the adversarial robustness.
2.2 Lipschitz Constraints in Neural Architecture
The discrete architecture A is determined by both connections and operations, which creates a huge
search space. Differentiable Architecture Search algorithms provide an efficient solution through
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Figure 1: An overview of proposed robust neural architecture search with confidence learning
algorithm. Each node in the cell is computed with operations mixture under architecture parameters
α for weighting operations and β for weighting inputs where α and β are sampled from multivariate
log-normal distributions. Meanwhile, the Lipschitz constant of each edge and cell induce to univariate
log-normal distributions. The Lipschitz constraint is formulated from cumulative distribution function.
the continuous relaxation of the architecture representation [18, 20, 21]. Within the differentiable
NAS framework, we decompose the entire neural network into cells. Each cell I is a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) consisting of an ordered sequence of n nodes, where each node denotes a latent
representation which is transformed from two previous latent representations and each edge (i, j)
denotes an operation o from a pre-defined search space O which transforms I(i). Following [19], the
architecture parameters α which weighs operations and β which weighs input flows are introduced to
form an operation mixture with weighted inputs. The intermediate node is computed as
I(j) =
∑
i<j
β(i,j)
∑
o∈O
α(i,j)o · o(I(i)), (5)
where I(0) and I(1) are fixed as inputs nodes during the searching phase and the last node is formed
by channel-wise concatenating of previous intermediate nodes I = ∪n−1i=2 I(i) as the output of cell.
The entire neural network is constructed through two different types of cells including the normal cell,
where all the operations have strides of 1, and the reduction cell, where all the operations have strides
of 2. With normal and reduction cells stacked in series, the entire neural network can be formed
as N = I1 ◦ I2 ◦ · · · ◦ IN ◦ C, where N denotes the number of cells and C denotes the classifier.
Following [19], after the searching phase, the operation o with the maximum β(i,j)α(i,j)o for each
edge (i, j) is selected and the connection of each node j to its two precedents i < j with maximum
β(i,j)α
(i,j)
o is selected so that a discrete superior architecture can be sampled from the supernet.
We now explore the relationship between architecture parameters α, β and Lipschitz constant of
network. Since the entire neural network is constructed by stacking cells in series as [I1, I2, ..., IN ],
Eq. 2 can be further decomposed as as
‖F(x˜)−F(x)‖ 6 λl‖N (x˜)−N (x)‖ 6 λlλC‖IN (x˜)− IN (x)‖
6 λlλCλ(IN )‖IN−1(x˜)− IN−1(x)‖, (6)
where λl, λC and λ(IN ) denote the Lipschitz constants of loss function, classifier and cell IN
respectively. By rewriting ‖IN−1(x˜) − IN−1(x)‖ in a format of its previous cells till the input of
cell becomes the image for I1 and considering ‖I1(x˜)− I1(x)‖ 6 λ(I1)‖x˜− x‖ = λ(I1)‖δ‖, Eq. 6
can be unfolded recursively and rewritten as
‖F(x˜)−F(x)‖ 6 λF‖δ‖ 6 ‖δ‖λlλC
N∏
k
λ(Ik). (7)
It is obvious that the adversarial robustness can be bounded by the Lipschitz constants of cells. Eq. 7
also suggests that the impact of perturbation grows exponentially with the number of cells, which
further highlights the influence of cell designing.
As λl and λC in Eq. 7 are not related to the architecture, we next focus on the discussion on λ(Ik).
Based on the operation mixture defined in Eq. 5, the variation of node I(j)k under perturbation can be
3
written in a format of that in previous node I(j)k . For simplicity of notation, we omit the subscript k
and for each node and we have
‖I(j)(x˜)− I(j)(x)‖ 6
∑
i<j
β(i,j)λ(i,j)‖I(i)(x˜)− I(i)(x)‖, s.t. λ(i,j) 6
∑
o∈O
α(i,j)o λo, (8)
where λ(i,j) denotes the Lipschitz constant of transformation from node i to j and λo denotes the
Lipschitz constant of operation o. Similarly, we can unfold Eq. 8 recursively for entire cell by
rewriting ‖I(i)(x˜)− I(i)(x)‖ in a format of its previous node, and have
λ(I(j)) 6
∑
i<j
β(i,j)
∑
o∈O
α(i,j)o λo. (9)
Through substituting λ(Ik) in Eq. 7 by the one in Eq. 9 and taking λl and λC as a unified constant C,
the lipschitz constant λF is bounded by the product of the Lipschitz constant of intermediate nodes
as
λF 6 C
N∏
k
λ(Ik) 6 C
N∏
k
n∏
j
λ(I(j)) 6 C
N∏
k
n∏
j
∑
i<j
β(i,j)
∑
o∈O
α(i,j)o λo. (10)
According to the definition, the Lipschitz constant of operations without convolutional layers can be
summarized as follows, (1). average pooling: S−0.5 where S denotes the stride of pooling layer, (2).
max pooling: 1, (3). identity connection: 1, (4). Zeroize: 0. For the rest operations including depth-
wise separate conv and dilated depth-wise separate conv, we focus on the L2 bounded perturbations
and according to the definition of spectral norm, the Lipschitz constant of these operations is the
spectral norm of its weight matrix where λo2 = ‖W o‖2, which also is the maximum singular value of
W , marked as Λ1. However, directly computing Λ1 is not practical through gradient descent. The
power iteration method can be applied for an efficient approximation of Λ1 [22]. Note that although
the perturbation is L2 bounded, the robustness against L∞ can be also achieved, as stated by [23].
2.3 Confident Architecture Sampling
The architecture is determined by parameters α and β, which further influence the Lipschitz constants
of the network, as shown in Eq. 10. Existing NAS algorithms used to initialize them as trainable
parameters without in-depth analysis. However, these weightings on operations or connections
naturally could have different levels of importance. E.g., the connection of the first node and the
one of the intermediate nodes have different influences on the final performance, but they are treated
equally in NAS framework. Instead, we tend to explore the confidence on the architecture parameters
by regarding them as variables sampled from distributions during architecture search.
For distributions, a naive selection can be a multivariate normal distribution. However, according to
the Lipschitz constant form in Eq. 10, the sampled values from this distribution need to be positive
since λF is always positive. Thus, we turn to log-normal distribution LN since it guarantees positive
sampled values. Most importantly, there are several nice properties, including the weighted sum of
multiple independent LN 1,...,n can be approximated with another LN and the product of multiple
independent LN 1,...,n induces to LN with mean and variance of the sum of those in LN 1,...,n. Thus
we propose to sample α from multivariate log-normal distributions, denoted as LN (µα,Σα), with
mean µα ∈ Rd and covariance matrix Σα ∈ Rd×d with diagonal standard deviation σα ∈ Rd where
d denotes the dimension of α. Similarly, we sample β from LN (µβ ,Σβ).
Back to the Lipschitz constant, the multivariate log-normal distribution over α induces a univariate
log-normal distribution over the upper boundary of Lipschitz constant of edge based on the operation
mixture
∑
o∈O α
(i,j)
o λo since it can be treated as the weighted sum of multiple log-normal distributed
variables. Note that λo is treated as constant here since the weights are fixed when optimizing
architecture parameters. The is proposed Lipschitz confidence constraint is shown in Fig .1.
Although there is no closed-form expression of its probability density function, the distribution can
be approximated using another log-normal distribution following [24] as:
λ(i,j) =
∑
o∈O
α(i,j)o λo v LN (ln[
∑
o
e(µ
α
o+ln(λo)+(σ
α
o )
2/2)]− σ
2
I(i,j)
2
, σ2I(i,j)),
σ2I(i,j) = ln[
∑
o e
(2(µαo+ln(λo))+(σ
α
o )
2)(e(σ
α
o )
2 − 1)
(
∑
o e
(µαo+ln(λo)+(σ
α
o )
2/2))2
+ 1])
(11)
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where λ(i,j) denotes the upper boundary of λ(i,j). For simplicity, we denote the mean for λ(i,j) as
µI(i,j) and variance as σ2I(i,j) . Similarly, we sample β from a multivariate log-normal distribution
N (µβ ,Σβ). For variable β(i,j)λ(i,j), it can be treated as the product of two log-normal distributions,
which also follows a log-normal distribution whose mean is the sum of means of two distributions
and variance as well. Thus, to generalize the distribution over edge λ(i,j) to the one over intermediate
node λ(j), we replace o with j, µαo + ln(λo) with µ
β
(i,j) + µI(i,j) , and (σ
α
o )
2 with (σβ(i,j))
2 + σ2
I(i,j)
in Eq 11 and obtain the log-normal distribution of λ(j) =
∑
i<j β
(i,j)λ(i,j) as
λ(j) =
∑
i<j
β(i,j)λ(i,j) v LN (ln[
∑
o
e
(µβ
(i,j)
+µ
I(i,j)
+([(σβ
(i,j)
)2+σ2
I(i,j)
]/2)
]− σ
2
I(j)
2
, σ2I(j)),
σ2I(j) = ln[
∑
j e
(2(µβ
(i,j)
+µ
I(i,j)
)+[(σβ
(i,j)
)2+σ2
I(i,j)
])
(e
[(σβ
(i,j)
)2+σ2
I(i,j)
] − 1)
(
∑
o e
(µβ
(i,j)
+µ
I(i,j)
+[(σβ
(i,j)
)2+σ2
I(i,j)
]/2)
)2
+ 1])
(12)
with mean and variance which are denoted as µI(j) and σ2I(j) . According to Eq. 10, λF is bounded
by the product of λ(j). Thus, λF follows the log-normal distribution with mean µ = In(C) +∑N
k
∑n
j µI(j) and variance σ
2 =
∑N
k
∑n
j σ
2
I(j)
. We introduce a confidence hyperparameter η ∈
[0, 1] to enable confidence learning with such an constraint as
Prα,β [λF 6 λ∗] = Prα,β [C
N∏
k
n∏
j
∑
i<j
β(i,j)
∑
o∈O
α(i,j)o λo 6 λ∗] > η, (13)
where λ∗ is the desired Lipschitz constant of F , Note that in Eq. 13, the variance of λF is reduced to
satisfy the inequality, which strengths the confidence on the approximation of Lipschitz constant of
λF , compared with the one in Eq. 10 without confidence learning. To obtain a convex constraint in µ
and Σ, we reformulate Eq. 13 through the format of cumulative function as
Pr[λF 6 λ∗] = Pr[
ln(λF )− µ
σ
6 ln(λ
∗)− µ
σ
] = Φ(
ln(λ∗)− µ
σ
), (14)
where Φ denotes the cumulative function of the normal distribution since ln(λF )−µσ is a random
variable following the normal distribution. Thus, we establish direct relationship among µ, σ and η
as
ln(λ∗)− µ
σ
> Φ−1(η). (15)
Through omitting the square root on σ, we achieve a convex constraint. Together with the objective
in Eq. 4, we rewrite the optimization objective as
min
µα,Σα,µβ ,Σβ ,W
E[F(x, y;W,A)], s.t. ln(λ∗)− µ > Φ−1(η)σ2,
A v LN (µα,Σα),LN (µβ ,Σβ).
(16)
Intuitively, the constraint in Eq. 16 reveals the influence of σ on sampling architecture parameters.
As σ increases, the value of µ decreases to satisfy the inequality where the corresponding µα and µβ
becomes 0 for relatively large σ, which implies that the operations or connections are unlikely to be
sampled when its corresponding confidence is low. Thus, the architecture can be sampled based on
its confidence in the Lipschitz constraint.
We apply the ADMM optimization framework to solve this constrained optimization through incor-
porating the constraint to form a minimax problem so that Eq. 16 can be rewritten as
min
µα,Σα,µβ ,Σβ
max
θ
LCE + θ(c(µ,Σ)) + ρ
2
‖c(µ,Σ)‖2F , c(µ,Σ) = µ+ Φ−1(η)σ2 − ln(λ∗), (17)
where θ is the dual variable and ρ is positive number predefined in ADMM. The first step is to update
µ while fixing other variables and the second step is to update σ while fixing other variables as
µt+1 ← µt − γOµ[LCE(yˆ, y) + θ(c(µ,Σt)) + ρ
2
‖c(µ,Σt)‖2F ],
σt+1 ← σt − γOσ[LCE(yˆ, y) + θ(c(µt,Σ)) + ρ
2
‖c(µt,Σ)‖2F ],
(18)
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where µα,Σα, µβ ,Σβ are updated through back-propagation. The dual variable θ is updated with
learning rate of rho as
θt+1 ← θt + ρc(µt,Σt) (19)
3 Experiments
In this section, we conduct a series of experiments to empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of
proposed RACL algorithm. We retrain the searched neural architecture and compare it with various
neural architectures searched by NAS algorithms as well as state-of-the-art network architectures.
We show that under the same adversarial training setting, the robust neural architectures searched by
RACL achieve better robustness than other NAS algorithms.
3.1 Experimental Setup
Following previous works [18, 19], we search the robust neural architectures on CIFAR-10 dataset
which contains 50K training images and 10K validation images over 10 classes. During the searching
phase, the training set is divided into two parts with equal size for architecture and weight optimization
respectively. The search space includes 8 candidates: 3× 3 and 5× 5 separable convolutions, 3× 3
and 5× 5 dilated separable convolutions, 3× 3 max pooling, 3× 3 average pooling, skip connection,
and zero, as suggested by previous works [18, 19]. The supernet is constructed by stacking 8 cells
including 6 normal cells and 2 reduction cells, each of which contains 6 nodes. For training settings,
we followed the setups of PC-DARTS [18]. The searching phase took 50 epochs with a batch size
of 128. We used SGD with momentum. The initial learning rate is 0.1 with a momentum of 0.9
and a weight decay is 0.0003 to update the supernet weights. Architecture parameters were updated
with Adam with a learning rate of 0.0006 and a weight decay of 0.001. We extensively evaluate the
proposed algorithm on three datasets including CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and MNIST. The searched
superior discrete architecture is sampled based on the proposed sampling strategy and retrained with
the entire training set. An illustration of the searched normal cell and reduction cell is shown in Figure
2. Following previous adversarial training algorithms [25, 14], we train the searched architectures in
an adversarial manner. For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we use PGD adversarial training with the
total perturbation size  = 8/255. The number of attack iteration is set to 7 with a step size of 2/255.
For MNIST,  = 76.5/255 with a step size of 20/255.
3.2 Against White-box Attacks
We compare the searched cells with those searched by NAS algorithms, including DARTS [18], PC-
DARTS [19], NASNet [26], AmoebaNet [21] and RobNet [12] as well as the state-of-the-art network
architectures ResNet and DenseNet [3, 4]. For robustness evaluation, we choose three powerful
attacks including Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [13], Momentum Iterative Method (MIM)
[27], and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [14]. Consistent with adversarial literature [14, 28],
the adversarial perturbation is considered under l∞ norm with the total perturbation  = 8/255 on
CIFAR-10/100 and 76.5/255 on MNIST. We consider two scenarios to demonstrate the effectiveness
of our proposed RACL algorithm. The detailed evaluation results are shown in Table 1.
Robustness of Architecture with AT We retrain the searched cells using PGD adversarial training
for all the models to evaluate the robustness of RACL on the main benchmark of defense mechanisms.
The iteration of PGD attack is set to 20 with a step size of 2/255, as suggested by [12]. Although
adversarial training is a strong defense method, the impact of architecture is always ignored. In this
Figure 2: The visualization of normal and reduction cell searched by RACL are shown in (a) and (b).
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With Adversarial Training Without Adversarial Training
Model Params Clean FGSM MIM PGD20 Clean FGSM MIM PGD10
ResNet-18 11.2 78.38 49.81 45.23 45.60 89.94 50.16 0.14 0.00
DenseNet-121 7.0 82.72 54.14 48.19 47.93 93.77 61.53 4.23 0.11
AmoebaNet 3.2 83.41 56.40 47.60 39.47 97.39 44.79 0.80 0.25
NasNet 3.8 83.66 55.67 53.05 48.02 97.37 47.53 1.01 0.42
DARTS 3.3 83.75 55.75 51.63 44.91 97.43 42.48 0.28 0.12
PC-DARTS 3.6 83.94 52.67 49.09 41.92 97.32 49.18 1.21 0.18
RobNet-small 4.4 78.05 53.93 48.98 48.32 - - - -
RobNet-medium 5.7 78.33 54.55 49.34 49.13 - - - -
RACL(ours) 3.6 83.89 57.44 54.73 49.34 97.44 50.53 4.68 1.93
Table 1: Evaluation of RACL adversarial robustness on CIFAR-10 with or without adversarial training
compared with SOTA models under white-box attacks. PGD10 denotes PGD attack with 10 iterations.
Table 2: Evaluation of RACL adver-
sarial robustness on CIFAR-10
under black-box attack setting.
Model FGSM MIM PGD10
AmoebaNet 82.2 81.5 82.4
NasNet 82.4 82.1 82.7
DARTS 81.5 81.2 82.6
PC-DARTS 82.8 82.3 83.0
RACL(ours) 82.8 82.5 83.3
Table 3: Transferability test on CIFAR-10 among differnet
models using PGD attack. The best results in each row are
in bold. Underline denotes the white-box robustness.
Source
Target AmoebaNet NasNet DARTS PC-DARTS ours
AmoebaNet 45.59 68.25 68.37 68.82 69.19
NasNet 64.62 51.72 65.61 64.41 66.10
DARTS 63.97 65.40 49.53 64.65 66.03
PC-DARTS 65.40 65.92 66.50 47.36 67.09
ours 64.99 65.43 65.83 64.78 53.29
experiment, we demonstrate that constructing networks through the neural architectures searched by
RACL can further improve the robustness after adversarial training. As shown in the left part of Table
1, the adversarially robust architectures have better adversarial accuracy than other state-of-the-art
cells after they are all adversarial trained. For example, compared with our baseline PC-DARTS,
though both RACL and PC-DARTS achieve similar clean accuracy and model size, the performance
of them with adversarial training varies differently. RACL achieves accuracy of 57.44% under
FGSM attack, with 4.77% improvement (52.67% → 57.44%) over that of PC-DARTS, and 7.42
improvement (41.92%→ 49.34%) over that of PC-DARTS under PGD attack, which indicates that
besides adversarial training, the adversarial robustness can be further improved through imposing
Lipschitz constraint on architecture parameters. We empirically show that RACL consistently achieves
the best performance compared with other NAS algorithms under various attacks. RobNet applies
robust architecture search algorithm to explore a RobNet family under different budgets [12]. For a
fair comparison, we compare RACL with those in RobNet family which have the similar model size
as RACL. Compared to RobNet-small and RobNet-medium, RACL consistently achieves the best
performance with fewer parameters, which highlights the superiority of proposed RACL algorithm.
Robustness of Architecture without AT We remove the adversarial training and directly retrain
the searched cells with clean images to evaluate how different neural architectures influence the
robustness. For PGD attacks, the iteration is set to 10 with a step size of /10. As shown in the right
part of Table 1, although the adversarial accuracy cannot be competitive, there exists an obvious gap
between state-of-the-art cells and adversarially robust cell. E.g., RACL achieves an accuracy of 4.68%
with 3.56% improvement over the one of PC-DARTS under MIM attack, which demonstrates that
the architecture itself could provide robustness. And the gap can be maintained (49.09%→ 54.73%)
or even enlarged after adversarial training through comparing the left and right parts of PC-DARTS
and RACL, which demonstrates the effectiveness of RACL on adversarial robustness.
Comparison with existing defense mechanisms To illustrate how robust architecture further
improves the performance of adversarial training, we compare RACL with previously proposed
defense mechanisms on different datasets, including CIFAR-10/100 and MNIST. The perturbation
budget  is set to 8/255 for CIFAR-10/100 and 76.5/255 for MNIST. Our baseline is PGD-AT
since the searched cells are PGD-adversarially retrained as in [14]. RACL is also compared with
L2NNN [23] which proposes to control Lipschitz constant to maximize confidence gaps, ADP
[29] which introduce the adaptive diversity promoting regularization to encourage diversity for
robustness improvement as well as TRADES [28] which proposes a regularization to encourage local
7
Figure 3: Robustness evaluation under different perturbation sizes and attack iterations.
Lipschitzness. The results are shown in Table 4. RACL achieves the best performance among all the
datasets, which demonstrates the superiority of adversarial training with a robust neural architecture.
3.3 Against Black-box Attacks
We next evaluate the robustness of RACL under black-box attacks. Following previous literature
[14, 30], we apply transfer-based black-box attacks which generate adversarial samples using a
victim model and feeds them to the target models. In this paper, we use a VGG-19 network as
the victim model and the performances of different models are compared when they are fed with
transferred adversarial samples. In Table 2, we show the results of NAS algorithms under different
black-box attacks. Compared with NAS algorithms, RACL achieves the highest accuracy under all
three black-box attacks, which demonstrates the effectiveness of proposed algorithm.
Following [12], we further conduct the transferability test on CIFAR-10. We use different NAS
algorithms as source models to generate adversarial samples through 10-iteration PGD attack and
feed them to other target models as cross black-box attack. The results are shown in Table 3. Each
row denotes the robustness of different target models under the black-box attack from the same source
model. Correspondingly, each column denotes the robustness of a target model under the attack from
different source models. Comparing each row, RACL achieves the best accuracy under the attacks
from different source models, which highlights the superiority of RACL under black-box settings.
Furthermore, through comparing the transferability between each model pair, RACL tends to generate
stronger adversarial samples. E.g., ours→ AmoebaNet achieves the successful attack success rate of
35.01% and AmoebaNet→ ours achieves the successful attack success rate of 30.81%.
3.4 Robustness under Various Perturbation Size and Attack Iterations
We further conduct experiments with different white-box attack parameters, including the size of
perturbation and the number of iterations. The detailed results are shown in Table 3. Following [12],
we strength the adversarial attack through boosting the attack iterations to 100 for PGD attack with
step size of 2/255. The comparison with other baselines are shown in Figure 3 (a) where RACL
consistently achieves the best accuracy for different PGD iterations. Furthermore, the superiority of
RACL becomes more obvious under 100-PGD attack. For example, comparing DARTS with RACL
on the PGD20 and PGD100, the gap increases 0.26 for larger attack iterations (44.91%→ 49.43% on
PGD20 and 44.26%→ 49.04% on PGD100). Compared to RobNet family with similar model size
on PGD100 [12], RACL achieves better performance with fewer parameters than RobNet-small and
RobNet-medium with 0.97% and 0.08% accuracy improvement respectively. Besides attack iterations,
we evaluate the adversarial robustness under different perturbation budget. As shown in Figure 3 (b,
c), the total perturbation size ranges from 0.01 to 0.07 for both PGD and FGSM attack. Our proposed
RACL algorithm always performs better than other baselines under different perturbation budget,
which illustrates that RACL can provide stronger defense against various adversarial attacks.
3.5 Ablation Analysis
In this section, we conduct ablation studies on the hyperparameters of RACL algorithm as well as
confidence learning. The ablation analysis is shown in Table 5. We first remove the confidence
learning and applies the constraint in Eq. 10. Comparing the first and last row, the adversarial
accuracy obtains a relatively large increment with confidence learning, which highlights the necessity
of proposed confident architecture sampling. We then investigate the influence of hyperparameter ρ
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Table 4: Comparison with existing defense tech-
niques under PGD attack on different datasets.
Model CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 MNIST
PGD-AT 46.2 23.2 98.0
L2NNN 42.5 - 92.4
ADP 48.4 18.1 82.8
TRADES 51.0 27.3 98.7
RACL(ours) 53.3 27.8 99.5
Table 5: Ablation Analysis of RACL with
respect to ρ and η.
Setting Clean FGSM MIM PGD10
Without CL 84.09 55.50 50.48 48.12
η = 0.9, ρ = 0.01 78.71 53.40 49.47 51.23
η = 0.9, ρ = 0.0001 85.24 55.54 48.64 45.54
η = 0.7, ρ = 0.001 82.15 55.60 51.42 51.17
η = 0.9, ρ = 0.001 83.89 57.44 54.73 53.29
and report the performance of searched robust cell on CIFAR-10 under different value of ρ. Through
comparison, ρ with a large value could hurt the classification performance on clean images. On
the contrary, ρ with small value reduces the influence of Lipschitz constraint and results in inferior
adversarial accuracy. The influence of confidence hyperparameter η is also investigated. From Eq.
16, η controls the balance between the mean and variance of Lipschitz constant λF . Comparing the
last two rows, η is set to 0.9 to obtain the best adversarial accuracy.
4 Related Work
Szegedy et al. first revealed the adversarial samples, which demostrated that neural networks are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks [13]. Vast techniques have been introduced to generate adversarial
samples in both white-box case where the model is fully accessible [31, 8, 32, 33] and black-box case
where adversaries can only query the outputs of the models [34, 35, 36, 37]. Besides classification,
adversarial attacks have been applied to other tasks, such as detection and segmentation [38, 39].
Recently, more attention has been paid to defense methods which tackle the vulnerability of neural
networks through improving the adversarial robustness. Gradient Masking methods hide the gradient
information to confound the adversaries [40, 41], however, they cannot defend attacks based on
approximate gradient [42]. Adversarial training is naturally introduced to defend attacks through
feeding adversarial examples into the training stage to form a min-max game where the inner
maximum generates adversarial samples to maximize the classification loss and outer minimum
optimizes model parameters to minimize the loss. Different attack strategies have been applied to
generate adversarial examples for adversarial training, such as PGD attack [14] and FGSM attack
[31]. Recently, some regularization methods have been introduced to defend against attacks. [15, 16]
propose to constrain the Lipschitz constant of network to improve the adversarial robustness.
Although vast approaches have been proposed to defend against adversarial samples, most of them
focus on optimizing the weights based on different strategies, and the impact of architecture has been
ignored. Recently, neural architecture search has received more and more attention due to its high
performance. Early NAS approaches heavily relied on macro searching which directly searches the
entire network [43, 44]. For efficiency, more NAS approaches have applied micro search space where
the cell is searched instead of the entire network and the cells are stacked in series to compose the
whole network [45, 26]. Recently, some differentiable searching algorithms have been introduced to
boost the searching speed through a relaxation on search space to form a supernet with operation
mixture to achieve differentiable architecture searching [18, 46, 19].
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose to tackle the vulnerability of neural networks by incorporating NAS
frameworks. Through sampling architecture parameters from trainable log-normal distributions, we
show that the approximated Lipschitz constant of the entire network can be formulated as a univariate
log-normal distribution, which enables the proposed algorithm, Robust Architecture with Confidence
Learning to form confidence learning of architecture parameters on the robustness through a Lipschitz
constraint. Thorough experiments demonstrate the influence of architecture on adversarial robustness
and the effectiveness of RACL under various attacks on different datasets.
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